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“Success in Banking is attained not by avoiding risk but by effectively selecting and managing risk”
ABSTRACT
There is an empirical evidence, which justify the core functioning of money in economic growth
and the development of a State, which equally establishes the reason of the relevant role of
Banks to every economy. The underpinning of this research, is to present the necessity for the
financial industry of undeveloped and developing economies very fragile in their functioning, to
adopt the proposed theoretical perspective of dynamic credit risk analysis and lending, as a
proposed upgrade model over the existing static risk analytical approach, found to be
ineffective in credit-lending-support to the productiveness of enterprises, emerging from such
economies, hence creating frustration to the welfare nature of the State and heightening it
unemployment tension.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In other for the paper to deeply establish the bases of it argument, with quality submission of
theoretical-model-analysis. Some relevant terminology used herein, lacking precise definition in
the taxonomy of economic science, has to be defined in the context of this paper based on
critical assessment of varied definition adopted by scholars in the economic science community.
And these two major terms are as follows;
i. Fragile Economy
ii. Credit Analysis & Risk
i. Fragile Economy
It is a term argued to have been coined by Morgan Stanley in 2013, representing an emerging
market economies that are too dependent on unreliable foreign investment to finance growth
ambitions. Bruce & Jennifer (2013) defined fragile economy as a National economic network to
venerable metropolitan economies, consisting of networks of innovative firms, talented
workers, risk-taking entrepreneurs, supportive Institution and associations that cluster together
in metropolitan areas and co-produce economic performance and progress. Demirek (2009),
almost like the intent of the originator of the word, defined fragile economy as an environment
where it firms rely heavily on external funds to finance its operational costs. However in respect
to this paper, fragile economy will be defined as, “an economy, experiencing a significant
weakness in it currency, making it difficult to finance it account deficits and growth projects,
contributing to a slow down and vulnerability in it welfare functioning”.There are numerous
factors known to cause economic fragility of a State, for instance, weak political institution,
poor constitution functionality, poor governance, poor financial industrial policies, bad tax
regulations, high cost of having a strong balance sheet as an enterprise, poorly developed
investment market, high inflationary effect, complex bureaucracy, low capital adequacy of
banks, and finally in respect of this paper, corruption. All the listed factors will be extensively
diagnosed to establish it significant contribution to a fragile economy and negative impact on
3Enterprise existence. Which will guide in analyzing the effectiveness of the use of Static-credit-
risk-analysis for potential profitable Enterprises that emerge from such economies, which is
mostly observed to be struggling to survive.
ii. Credit Analysis & Risk
Kagan (2018) defined credit analysis, as a type of analysis that an investor or bond portfolio
manager performs on companies or debt issuing entities, to measure the entity’s ability to
meet it debt obligations. Which the content of this paper, do concur with the above definition
to establish the bases of it theoretical argument. Banks remain a major conduit for the
transformation of Savings into productive investments. And much particular in emerging
countries where capital markets are still not sufficiently developed and where savers have
limited access to direct-credit-risk-opportunities. Jonathan & Philippe (2013) state, Banks and
Financial Systems should share the blame with profligate politicians, outdated socioeconomic
models and a shift of the world’s center of gravity towards new comers in the financial-
economic warfare. And further argued, Banks cannot survive unless they take risks. The trick for
them is to manage those risks without destroying shareholders value. The fatter the better,
from credit worthiness point of view and without endangering depositors and creditors. It must
be acknowledged, financial intermediaries like Banks do carry substantial credit and market
risks. They act as the shock absorbers by removing it from their depositors’ shoulders and
charge hefty fee for the services. It is observed, no individual with money to spare, that is
Savings or Capital, will provide credit on a commercial basis, unless she believes that the
borrower has both the requisite willingness and capacity to repay the funds, advanced. To form
such believe rationally, she must be satisfied that, the two questions can be answered in
affirmative. Which are;
a) The prospective borrower will be willing, so long as the obligation exists, to repay it?
b) The prospective borrower will be able to repay the obligation, when required under its
terms?
4To respond to these questions, a credit analysts will re-sought to a judgment of probability.
Banks acceptance of credit risk is inherent to their operations, since the very reason of
existence as banks, is the supply of credit through the advance of cash and the corresponding
creation of financial obligations. Credit Risk in the perspective of this paper will be defined as,
“the risk of money loss arising from the default of a counter-party on a fundamental financial
obligation or higher than expected loss of severity, arising from a lower than expected exposure
at the time of default”. The following is a formulated assessment of credit risk in the framework
of this paper assumed as the generally accepted tradition of the banking industry:
a. Examining the obligator’s capacity and willingness to repay credit
b. The country risk and operational conditions as in it macroeconomic climate that the
obliged is exposed to.
c. Examining the attributes of obligation from which the credit risk arises in the instance of
legal or derivative risk and character of currency.
d. Assessing the credit risk and mitigation such as collateral utilization, pledges, guarantees
and insurance.
The concern herein is not the underlying probability of default but the degree of uncertainty
associated with forecasting this probability. As Hale (1983) succinctly put across, if the pawn
broker lends money against a gold watch, he does not need credit analysis. He needs instead to
know the price of the gold watch in respect to time. The Traditional Credit analysts of the
banking sector are best known of sieving through quantum of data ranging from cash flows,
credit history, in its ratio and trend analysis to draw a probability line in terms of exposure to
default, the recovery rate and the loss given default. Which this style of credit analysis
modeled as structural and reduced form is the accepted standards of the Banks. The [structural
model] considers the positions of stakeholders of the company, while the [reduced-form model]
seek to predict, when a default may occur based on observable variables. Which the proposed
theoretical construct of this paper in conclusion seek to critique against the stringent
application of this model in fragile economy due to it questionable effectiveness and reliability
5observed over a decades in such economy as an ex-post study, hence provide alternative model
as a theoretical perspective.
2. DISCUSSING FACTORS CONSIDERED TO CONTRIBUTE TO FRAGILE ECONOMY
AND POOR ENTERPRISE FUNCTIONING
Even though, there is observed wide range of factors identified to contribute significantly to the
cause of fragile economy, this paper narrow the analysis of the observable factors, which affect
a fragile economy as well translate to poor functioning of a productive Enterprises due to credit
accessibility and underdeveloped financial industry. Which are;
I. Weak Governance and Political Institution
II. Poor constitutional functionality
III. Poor developed investment market
IV. Bureaucracy
V. Corruption
VI. Banks capital adequacy
I. Weak Governance and Political Institution
It was suggested by Adji et.al (1997) as well as Feng & Chen (1997) that a political government,
which is an active economic participant, can positively intervene to shape an environment to
attract investment. They further argue that, lower political capacity, indicate less ability to
extract resources, which critically implies higher budget deficits and an increase in uncertainty.
Finally, they observed that, faced with low capacity, a country is more likely to create new taxes
or increase existing ones, thereby reducing the return on investments. Which sum up to the
fact that capable government align their policies with sound macroeconomics criteria, while
weak governments stress political survival and mostly exposed to challenges, which act as a
huge frustration to Enterprise survival in such economy. When political Institution formed is
captured as an ideological gloss through which the minority who exercise real power through
the State and it monopoly, seek to conceal this fact from the subject population as Lenin (1917),
did put it in his paper the State and Revolution, then the Institution become hopeless in it
6function denied in it expected benefit to its members, than to serve the interest of the political
elite. In such a circumstance, Enterprises not engaging in cronyism, suffocate in a smooth and
successful growth in such economy as observed from this studies.
II. Poor Constitutional Functionality
In an economic environment, where the legitimacy of the State, the nature of its authority and
the nature of its obligations to its citizens and of its citizens to it, lack clarity, with the
constitution functioning not as the rule of law but the rule of men ruled by subjective and
arbitrary will of particular men instead of objective determinant of general and public laws, as
Kant (1724-1804) asserted, for a strong constitution, is a union of an aggregate of men under
rightful law. In such a circumstance, the labour of men through their enterprises to serve the
market as well as to generate private property are easily undermined, and mischievously
destroyed in the spirit of plundering, which weaken the spirit of innovation, creativity and
sacrifice through entrepreneurship for economic growth, a major challenge faced by
Enterprises in fragile economy, as observed from this studies.
III. Poor developed Investment Market
Poor developed investment market could be defined as an economic environment, whereby
either bank-based or market-based financial system are poorly developed in promoting long-
run economic growth. Stiglitz (1985) submit that, well developed markets quickly and publicly
reveal information, which reduces the incentives for individual investors to acquire information.
While Boot et.al (1993) indicate, Banks reveal of information is slow to public due to it long run
relationship with firms, however with Boot & Thakor (1997) added to the debate that, a
coordinated coalitions of investors with Bank is better than uncoordinated with the market,
where monitoring firms and reducing post-lending moral hazards is weak. Bhide (1993) also
posit that, liquid markets hold a myopic investor climate, making bank-based system a
preferable in policy guide and a reliable theoretical practice. So in fragile economy whereby
7both the Bank-based and Market-based financial system are underdeveloped, causes visionary
enterprises to struggle in productivity and smooth growth. Further observed from this studies
that in such an environment, investors hold the assumption that, there is a potential high risk to
invest in privates sector of such economy, despite the evidence that the sector is holding the
highest volume of macroeconomic contribution to the performance of the State. And even if, it
is considered by Investors as an environment to supports, they then expect it to be politically
guaranteed, a process that slows economic growth and innovations by private hands.
IV. Bureaucracy
As Niskanen Jr. (1990) argued, a large part of our population wants to expand the role of
government particularly to alleviate poverty and improve the environment, correspondingly
large part of our population is exasperated by the methods of bureaucracy and dissatisfied by
its performance, just as Max Weber (1864-1920) recognized bureaucracy as the characteristic
form of public administration for a State with extended territorial sovereignty developed, what
has become the standard definition of this form of organization in our contemporary times. Von
Mises book ‘bureaucracy’, had established relevant information, he argued, ‘bureaus’
specialized in the supply of those services, the value of which cannot be exchanged for money
at per-unite rate. As a consequence of the above, ‘bureaus’ cannot be managed by profit goals
and the economic calculus, therefore must be centrally managed by the pervasive regulation
and monitoring of the activities of subordinates with the absolute solution, to reduce the scope
of government. Enterprise success in both endogenous and exogenous climate of a State
depends much on strategic exploitation of opportunities in respect to time. In an advent of
competition, time become a valuable commodity to take advantage of, which fragile economy
drawn in complex bureaucracy, lacking respect to time and speed of the market development
as a result of a system architecturally designed to serve self-interest and political elite,
downplaying the struggle of an entrepreneurs effectiveness and Enterprise efficiency is
observed to be the major cause of venture collapsing in such economies.
8V. Corruption
Olken & Pande (2012) posits that, survey evidence suggest that corruption is rampant in the
developing world and more prevalent in developing countries than in rich ones and justify
further, there is a situation where ‘bureaucrats’ official salaries were less than their market
wage in expectation of the corrupt rents, they would obtain. Mocan (2008) finds that, the
income and education of the individual have positive impacts in the likelihood of being asked
for bribe in developing countries. There is an Instances, reported by Reinikka & Svensson (2004),
using public expenditure tracking survey, they compared the amount of special education block
grant sent down from the Central government of Uganda, with the amount of the Block grant
received by the schools. They estimated a leakage rate of 87%. Another instance, which Olken
(2007) report of a rural road projects. He compares the official amount spent on the road to an
independent engineers, estimate of what the road actually cost to build, in which engineers dug
core sample of the roads to estimate material quantities, did price surveys to estimate local
prices, and interviewed villagers to estimate actual wages paid, it was realized, some amount
of materials disappeared during construction. And an estimated missing expenditures in
respect of the village claim and the engineering estimation to the promoted cost was
approximately 24% per average. Olken & Pande (2012) did further argue that, corruption
lessens the government’s ability to correct an externality. If someone can bribe a police officer
or a judge instead of paying an official fine, the marginal cost of breaking the law is reduced
from the official fine to the amount of the bribe. Furthermore argued, if the police officer
extracts the same bribe regardless of whether the person has broken the law, the marginal cost
of breaking the law falls to zero, and the law ceases to have a disincentive effect altogether. An
environment which has a strong networks of corruption driven in complex innovations, any
honest transactions, which should be the hallmark of any successful and credible enterprise,
becomes difficult, as a result, a long term progression of such a venture in competing against it
counterpart in strong economic environment becomes questionable.
9VI. Capital Adequacy of Banks
In the studies of Inoue et.al (2019) on lending behaviour of Banks, they submitted, when a
substantial adverse shocks hits the economy and many borrowers become insolvent and banks
face impaired capital. There are two types of lending behaviour observed, which are, stagnant
lending in a capital crunch and forbearance lending. With the stagnant lending in a capital
crunch, the banks decrease credit to borrowers, irrespective of whether they are good or bad
borrowers. While that of Forbearance lending, the banks conduct window-dressing to avoid the
realization of capital losses and thus allocate more credit to insolvent borrowers, with the hope
that their situations will improve with also the premise that, the impaired banks adopt this
lending behaviour as a considerable effort to avoid further deterioration of their balance sheets.
In practice, it implies the stagnant lending in a capital crunch involves the issue of overall credit
under-supply to all borrowers. Whereas forbearance lending involves the issue of credit
allocation to low-quality borrowers. As the spirit of this paper seeks to promote a lending
model very effective in fragile economy, this do requires a very vibrant banking industry.
Diamond (1984) and Calomiris & Wilson (2004) argued that, in the models of banking, under
asymmetric information, do emphasize that the potential conflict of interest, is between the
banks and depositors. And such an informational problem, encourages the banks to offer short-
term-low-risk debt, concentrating most in the balance sheet risk of their capital and thus
insulating depositors from this risk. Therefore it is important to determine whether banks are
well capitalized enough to absorb their balance sheet risk and stabilize the banking system.
Since the theoretical preposition of the paper on dynamic-credit-risk analysis and lending is
established on the premise of a vibrant banking sector of a fragile economy, this do then
promote a debate on signals of an economy to serve as a predictive power for Banks failure.
Haldane (2014) and Bulow & Klemperer (2015) pointed out that regulatory measures of Bank
Capital do not necessarily have predictive power for Bank failures. Empirically, Haldane &
Madouros (2012) and Sarin and Summers (2016) measured Bank risk using both regulatory
measures and market measures. And realized, the market measures, which is defined as the
Capital ratio in the value of equity relations to total assets has the most explanatory power in
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predicting banks failure, than regulatory measures of bank capital in respect to Basel accord.
The limitation of this paper was to ignore the theoretical factors that anchors vibrancy to bank
operations in credit-lending within fragile economy for instance the arguments of Khwaja &
Mian (2008) and (Jimens et.al. 2012; 2014) in understanding bank loans level data and firms-
level panel data to appreciate the omitted variable problems in controlling borrower-side
factors in bank loan equation but rather relied squarely on the theoretical pathway for effective
credit-lending for a successful industrial progression. Which we believe further studies in the
recommended area, could explore this factors, metrically.
3. DYNAMIC CREDIT RISK ANALYSIS & LENDING MODEL
This section of the paper seeks to analyzed the exiting model of credit-risk-analysis termed as
Model ‘E’ by this paper and establish the empirical evidence of it inefficiency in fragile economy
and the preposition of an upgrade model termed by this paper as Model ‘D’ to address the
weaknesses of model ‘E’ application in fragile economy. In the theoretical settings of model ‘E’,
it is observed per practical experience that, the tool is applicable to Enterprises, observed to
have a historic operational existences in an economy, hence used three (3yrs) as the average
data qualification used by the financial industry as a criteria for credit application and approval.
And then followed with other risk-metric assessment and quantification. Enterprise chosen to
be analyzed on the scale of probability in credit-risk-analysis, is expected to meet at least the
four major required criteria outlined below as parametric conditions;
i. The Enterprise is assured of profitability for short, medium and long term
ii. The Enterprise has passed credibility test
iii. The Enterprise has a successful historical data of operational performance.
iv. The Management credibility and integrity test
When those parameters are met, then the actual Credit risk analysis of the Banks of the
Financial Institution is generally observed to follow the model below in a diagram format,
defined by the paper as ‘Static Credit Analysis’.
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Fig. A1. Model ‘E’
E. T. Senzu (2019), Credit-Lending- risk analysis model structure
The efficiency of Model ‘E’, passing through an empirical and evaluation test as an Old Static
Banking approach in credit-risk-analysis, experimented in the following chosen countries, as a
sample frame for the idealized fragile economies, were,
1. Ghana
2. Nigeria
3. Uganda
4. Liberia
5. Zimbabwe
A total of two hundred (200) companies were engaged, all within this five chosen countries as a
case study approach in respect to Best and Kaln (1998), as they argue that, case study probes
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deeply and analyzed interactions between factors that explain present status or influence
change. The size of the sample, which was two hundred (200) companies, was believed by the
researcher as sufficient enough to be a good inference as Fink and Kosecoff (1995) posits, the
size of a population from which the sample of a particular size is drawn has virtually no impact
on how well a sample is likely to describe a population. Finally Fowler (1993) did also assert, a
sample size of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents could describe a population of fifteen
thousand (15,000) or five hundred million (5,000,000) with virtually the same degree of
accuracy, assuming all other aspects of the design and sampling procedure were the same.
This two hundred (200) companies selected were based on their interest for Credit facility
within the period when the research study was conducted and the research by favour had
access to their data of credit application in the period of 2018 October to 2019, February from
the Financial Institutions of their choice, with their request processed at the time when the
research studies was still on-going. Therefore Figure A2 below, define the structural component
of the Enterprises surveyed as a sample frame of the population
Fig. A2
E. T. Senzu, 2019; field Report
To be able to complete the empirical testing of the efficiency of Model ‘E’ in the chosen fragile
economies, the following question was asked
Q1. How many of the companies, had their credit facility approved among the two hundred
companies who applied for it? The findings were tabled as Table X1
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Table X1
E. T. Senzu, 2019; field Report.
A total of two hundred (200) companies, which applied for the credit facility as 100% sample
frame work, with the response presented above. It was observed, only 15% out of the two
hundred (200) loan applications were considered for credit facility approval, by going through
Model ‘E’ Credit-Risk-Analysis and Lending framework, as it has always been, per the traditional
banking approach. This empirically, justify the argument of the paper on the inefficiency of the
use of Model ‘E’ diagram, shown above, as a credit-risk-analytical approach for a fragile
economy, 100% request of loans only 15% qualified per the approach used for the credit-risk-
analysis. To further examine the cause of it weakness as a traditional credit-risk-analytical
banking model, another question was asked to the respondents.
Q2. Why were you disqualified, despite meeting the parametric conditions stated above, as the
Enterprise being profitable, credible and has historical data of operational performance and
competent management of high repute?
Findings were tablized as X2, below.
Table X2.
Reasons behind Credit disqualification
Types of Companies Percentage of Company Size (%) Granted Credit Facility (%)
Corporate Companies &
Multinationals 8% 4%
Medium Scale Enterprise 27% 8%
Small Scale Enterprise 41% 3%
Micro Scale Enterprise 24% 0%
100% 15%
Response Rate
1
Credit history suffered discrepancies with the reason of most, to
avoid tax burden 34%
2
A weak economic environment due to weak governance
capacity 22%
3 Weak collateralization and guarantors 12%
4
High Interest rate, making the credit facility dis-
interesting 15%
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E. T. Senzu, 2019; field report
Even though, at the exposure to the empirical evidence, it indicated the targeted respondents
had more than one reason to be denied of credit facility by these banks, however the study
rather dwell much on the core factor among the list of factors in respect to the companies to be
denied the credit facility. With this studies, it has empirically justified, that most of the causes,
resulting to disqualification of Enterprises credit accessibility, falls within Model ‘E’ framework
in Credit-Risk-Analysis, which the paper seeks to advance this model theoretically into an ideal
Model ‘D’ framework of Credit-Risk-Analysis, which is proposed to be efficient tool for fragile
economy to the benefit of Enterprise developers in such regions. With the Model ‘D’ framework
designed below as Fig. A3
Fig. A3.
Senzu (2019) Model D- Credit-Lending-risk analysis structure
5 Unreliable location of the Enterprises 2%
85%
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The above Model ‘D’ as shown by Fig. A3 as a Credit-Risk-Analysis and Lending tool, is uphold as
dynamic and relatively efficient in it structural implementation comparable to Model ‘E’ as
shown at Fig. A1, because it takes into consideration the triggers of fragile economy that
counter a smooth and innovative growth of Enterprises of such economy under financial
constraint. The Model ‘D’ stresses it analytical tool on the parametric qualification of the
Enterprises, if such is met, whatever identified risk, will mitigate it for an easy credit
accessibility for Enterprise progressive functioning. However the weakness of Model ‘D’ Credit
risk-analysis and lending, is it inability to asses start-up ventures having zero years of historical
performance. Which the paper further postulate Model ‘S’ to replace Model ‘D’ in Enterprise
funding, when the Venture is in a quixotic stage. For a State to adopt Model ‘S’, then the
government of such a fragile economy, should have an interest of private sector empowerment
as an engine of it economic growth, while it innovatively channel most of it graduate students
into entrepreneurship; then the proposed model ‘S’ designed below to address credit-risk-
analysis and lending will require a central Institution termed as [SME-EXIM-BANK] enacted by
Law in it operational existence, with it source of funding generated by Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP) to guide successful implementation of the model. Then the ultimate
parametric qualification of venture proposal is to prove the significant contribution of such an
idealized venture impacts on Gross domestic production (GDP) of such economy, when projects
risk analysis is carefully analyzed and quantified. Then with the model ‘S’ framework shown
below as Fig. A4, will be applicable.
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Fig.4 Model ‘S’
E. T. Senzu (2019) model ‘S’ credit-lending-risk analysis structure
4. RELEVANCY OF STUDIES
Over the years there is a general impression created by literature of political economics of
developing countries, arguing in favour of supremacy of the fiscal policies being an effective
tools of government, dictating the success of a welfare state. Which this paper seeks to critique
the exuberant of such ideological positioning and prove that, beyond fiscal policy interventions
of government, an exceptional attention of government need to be paid on vibrancy of it
Banking system in the area of credit lending to Enterprises in fragile economies or else the hope
of a welfare state will fail as time elapses, which is justified below, mathematically.
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It is assumed that, in any fragile Economy with an observed constant government fiscal policy
approach as an intervention to economic market performance instead of a supposedly free-
market functioning towards equilibrium will be defined with constant (GP), then the below
equation is believed to hold as follows,
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Eq.4 and Eq.5 inserted into Eq.3 to produce Eq.6 and Eq.7
       
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The final derivation concludes and justify that, for every welfare state, beyond government
fiscal policy intervention, it requires a well-capitalized Banking system, strong purchasing power
of currency, a good wage rate and high credit lending rate as proven by the equation (7), which
comes with a quality credit-lending-models to be used by the banks. Such has been the focus of
this paper, specifically on crediting-lending-models very effective as a theoretical proposed
models to be adopted by banks in fragile economies.
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
There are three models, which the paper have presented, beginning with the old traditional
Credit-risk-analysis and lending approach adopted generally by the Financial Industry, mostly
the banking sector, with the first model framework defined by this paper as Model ‘E’ with it
weakness of application explored, when experimented in fragile economies. As a result, the
paper further postulated an advanced version of the credit-risk-analysis and lending of model
‘E’ and termed it as Model ‘D’ and ‘S’ framework, exhibited above for efficient application in
fragile economy, depending on the ‘life-span’ of the venture, either three (3) years or more of
productive existence, and Zero (0) year productive existence in other words, a venture in an
idealistic stage, for the Banks to resort to the use of Model-S’ and ‘D’ instead of ‘E’ model
analysis frame work for credit lending. These additional models developed theoretically, is to
help widen the risk analytics and assessment scope of Enterprises in accessing funds in fragile
economy, unlike the straight-jacket-approach, which denied most potential and successful
ventures that opportunity to prove itself, how much it worth and the viability in both the short,
medium and long term productivity, due to financial constraint.
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The researcher do recommend, any further research in this area of studies, should focus on
lending behaviours of Banks in fragile economy, approach and methods to improve its potency
and sustainability.
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